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REMARKS: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND
IMPEACHMENT: HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS, FROM
INDIANA AND BEYOND
JOHN D. FEERICK*
I thank you for the opportunity to address you today on presidential
succession and the impeachment provisions of the Constitution.
Two heroes in my life as a lawyer are from this state. The first is former U.S.
Senator Birch Bayh, who I first met in January 1964 when the American Bar
Association assembled twelve lawyers and their guests to develop a position with
respect to the subjects of presidential inability and vice-presidential vacancy.
Bayh became the undisputed leader of the movement for change as a way of
honoring a fallen President, John F. Kennedy, whose assassination two months
before the ABA conference focused the nation on the gaps in the presidential
succession system. Bayh also inspired me in the importance of a lawyer rendering
public service. It is inspiring for me to give these remarks below the Speaker’s
chair that he occupied.
The second hero is Dean James White, a longtime professor at this law
school, who served for thirty years as a consultant to the ABA in the areas of
admission to the bar and legal education. He helped me transform from a
practicing lawyer to an academic lawyer as a dean and professor at Fordham Law
School.
Today’s program on Indiana’s Vice Presidents of the United States is also
part of my Indiana history. In 1966, I was asked to write a book for high school
students, a first of its kind, on the vice presidents, which I proceeded to do with
the help of my wife, Emalie.1 I learned in the process of four of the six Vice
Presidents from Indiana: Schuyler Colfax, Thomas Hendricks, Charles Fairbanks,
and Thomas Marshall. Since I wrote my book, two more Indiana Vice Presidents
have been elected: Dan Quayle and current Vice President, Michael Pence.
All six, interestingly enough, were part of, or at least impacted by,
presidential succession or impeachment events. Schuyler Colfax was the Speaker
of the House during President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment in 1868.2 Five
years later, when Colfax was serving as Ulysses S. Grant’s Vice President, a

* Norris Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Fordham University School of Law. I wish
to express my deep gratitude to two individuals for helping me with my speech at the Indiana Law
Review symposium on March 28, 2018 and this article: my colleague on the adjunct faculty, John
Rogan, and William Pierotti of the Fordham Law School Class of 2019. Without their assistance
with research, drafting and editing, the speech and article would not have been possible. I also wish
to thank former Vice President Dan Quayle for allowing me to interview him concerning the
subject of presidential inability. It was a great honor for me to have that opportunity, the results of
which can be found in this article.
1. JOHN D. FEERICK & EMALIE P. FEERICK, THE VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
(1967).
2. Schuyler Colfax, 17th Vice President (1869-1873), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/generic/VP_Schuyler_Colfax.htm [https://perma.cc/Q2DR-9V6Y]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
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House committee considered impeaching Colfax for allegedly receiving a bribe
when he was in Congress.3 Before his involvement with impeachment, Colfax
witnessed a tragic moment in the country’s presidential succession history when
he was in the room where President Lincoln died in 1865.4
The second Indiana Vice President, Thomas Hendricks, died in office in
1885, providing an impetus for Congress to change the line of succession, which
had been left empty by Hendricks’ passing. Hendricks’ death also illustrated the
problem of vice-presidential vacancy.5
Charles Fairbanks was Vice President to Theodore Roosevelt, who had
succeeded to the presidency after President William McKinley’s assassination in
1901.6 The McKinley assassination may have had a significant impact on
Fairbanks’ career. When Fairbanks was a Senator, he was a political ally of
McKinley, and was seen as a possible successor to him—until the assassination.7
Thomas Marshall, the fourth Indiana Vice President, was in office when
Woodrow Wilson suffered a stroke that incapacitated him for the final year-anda-half of his term. Marshall resisted calls to act as president during Wilson’s
inability, in part due to the lack of procedures for declaring a presidential
inability.8
Vice President Dan Quayle took part in an unprecedented planning for uses
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment by meeting with President George H.W. Bush
at the start of their terms in 1989 to discuss how the amendment should be used.9
Current Vice President Pence serves when calls for impeachment and use of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment occur from time to time.10
The first part of my remarks addresses the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Senator
Bayh’s great achievement, and the second part addresses presidential
impeachment.

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT : ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 38 (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT ].
6. Charles Warren Fairbanks, 26th Vice President (1905-1909), U.S. SENATE, https://www.
s e n a t e . g o v / a r t a n d h istory/h istory/com m on /gen eric/V P _ C h a r le s _ Fa ir b a n k s . h t m
[https://perma.cc/QUK8-V4X6] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
7. Id.
8. See TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 14-16.
9. Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 5, at 200-02. In an interview with former Vice
President Quayle that I conducted for this article, he described the meeting on Twenty-Fifth
Amendment planning and other experiences during the first Bush administration. Excerpts from
the interview are in Appendix A.
10. See, e.g., Ross Douthat, The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/opinion/25th-amendment-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/QGA4-6W9W]; Christina Marcos, House Rejects Democrat’s Resolution to
Impeach Trump, HILL (Dec. 6, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/363544-house-rejectsdemocratic-resolution-to-impeach-trump [https://perma.cc/6S8Q-ZHN2].

2019]

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND IMPEACHMENT

45

I. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
As the framers drafted the Constitution, they wisely anticipated that the
President might die, resign, be removed, or suffer an inability in office. To
provide for these contingencies, they included Article II, Section 1, Clause 6,
which states,
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress
may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or
Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.11
In sum, the Succession Clause made the Vice President the first successor to
the presidency in the event of the President’s death, resignation, removal or
inability. It also gave Congress the power to appoint successors beyond the Vice
President for situations when both the President and Vice President vacated their
offices or became disabled.
But there were significant ambiguities and gaps in the Succession Clause.
First, it was unclear about the Vice President’s status after succession. Was it the
President’s “Office” that devolved on the Vice President in cases of removal,
death, resignation and inability or merely the President’s “Powers and Duties”?
This distinction may not have had much practical consequence in cases of death,
resignation or removal. However, it was problematic when the President became
disabled. If the President’s office and title devolved on the Vice President, the
disabled President might not be able to return to it, even if he recovered.
Another ambiguity in the Succession Clause was the lack of guidance for
identifying presidential inabilities. Although the clause listed “Inability” as a case
for succession, it did not define inability or provide a way to declare its existence
and termination, which made it harder for the Vice President to assume
presidential power when the president became disabled.
The Succession Clause also created a debate that continues to this day about
which officials Congress can appoint as presidential successors. The clause
empowered Congress to “declar[e] what Officer shall act as President” after the
President and Vice President.12 Many, including framers like James Madison,
have interpreted “Officer” to refer to non-legislators.13 This interpretation views

11. U.S. CONST . art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
12. Id.
13. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE SECOND
REPORT OF THE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT COMMISSION 26 (2009), https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_continuity_of_government.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2EF-R7U3];
JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 61-62 (1965)
(quoting James Madison) [hereinafter FROM FAILING HANDS]; Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David
Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 114-17 (1995);

46

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:43

the term “Officer” as shorthand for “Officers of the United States”—a
constitutional phrase that refers to executive branch officials and judges.14 Others
view the “Officer” term as open to a broader interpretation that includes members
of Congress. They point to constitutional provisions that call members of
Congress “officers.”15
Despite concerns about the constitutionality of legislators serving as
successors, the first Congress created a line of succession listing the Senate
President pro tempore followed by the Speaker of the House.16 The death of Vice
President Hendricks played a role, as noted, in Congress changing the 1792
succession law. His death in office in November 1885 left the line of succession
completely vacant: there was no longer a Vice President, and Congress had not
convened to choose a President pro tempore and Speaker of the House.17
When Congress returned to session in December 1885, it quickly focused on
the vacant line of succession as well as the constitutional concerns with having
legislators as successors. Only two months after Hendricks’ passing, in January
1886, it passed a new line of succession comprised only of Cabinet Secretaries
listed in the order of the creation of their departments.18 That line remained in
place until 1947, when Congress created the current line of succession.19 The
Presidential Succession Act of 1947 retained the Cabinet Secretaries as
successors, but returned congressional leaders to the line, placing the Speaker of
the House first in the line after the Vice President and the Senate President pro
tempore second.20 This statute kept one of the Succession Clause’s major
ambiguities—the meaning of “Officer”—looming over the nation’s presidential
succession framework. It also includes a requirement of questionable
constitutionality that a Cabinet member who has succeeded to the presidency be
“bumped” from being Acting President as soon as a new Speaker or President pro

Ruth C. Silva, The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 47 MICH. L. REV. 451, 457-75 (1949).
14. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, Ensuring the Stability
of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 37 (2012) [hereinafter First
Fordham Clinic Report].
15. See Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 1019-27 (2010).
16. Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).
17. See TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 38.
18. Id. at 38-40; see also Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1, 1 (repealed
1947).
19. After President Franklin D. Roosevelt died in office and Harry Truman succeeded to the
presidency in 1945, the next person in the line of the succession was the Secretary of State. The
presence of an unelected official in that spot led Truman to call on Congress to return legislators
to the line. See HARRY S. TRUMAN, QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES : TRANSMITTING REQUEST FOR LEGISLATION DEALING WITH
THE QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION , H.R. Doc. No. 246 (1945), available at
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=twentyfifth_amendme
nt_executive_materials [https://perma.cc/ZM6Z-Y9H3].
20. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2019).
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tempore is chosen.21
Thankfully, not all of the Succession Clause’s ambiguities and gaps are still
with us. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment addressed most of them—but not before
those issues were revealed by tragedies.
In 1841, President William Henry Harrison succumbed to pneumonia only
a month after his inauguration, becoming the first president to die in office. Vice
President John Tyler asserted that under the Succession Clause he had become
President, instead of acting president, for the rest of Harrison’s term. Some
members of Congress objected. They seized on the Succession Clause’s
ambiguous language about the Vice President’s post-succession status. But Tyler
did not back down, and his claim that he had become President for the rest of the
term set a precedent that would complicate future disability crises.22 The
precedent was further solidified by Vice President Millard Fillmore’s succession
to the presidency after President Zachary Taylor’s death in 1850, and Vice
President Andrew Johnson’s succession after President Abraham Lincoln’s
assassination in 1865.23
Sixteen years after the Lincoln assassination, President James Garfield was
shot and wavered between life and death for nearly three months,24 yet Vice
President Chester Arthur resisted acting as president. There were several reasons
for Arthur’s hesitancy—including that Garfield’s assassin exclaimed,
immediately after firing on the President, that Arthur would be president.2 5 But
the Tyler precedent and the Succession Clause’s shortcomings made the situation
especially challenging.
In the weeks after the shooting, Garfield’s doctor issued a stream of
misleading statements indicating that Garfield’s condition was improving.26 The
hope that Garfield might fully recover made the Tyler precedent an important
factor as the Cabinet and Arthur decided what to do.27 If Arthur acted as
president, the precedent indicated that he would become president and
permanently displace Garfield, regardless of whether he recovered—a result
which seemed unconscionable as the country was pulling for Garfield’s recovery.
Even if Arthur had wanted to take over presidential powers and duties, the
lack of both constitutional procedures and a definition of “inability” made it hard
for him to do so. Arthur did not assume the presidency until Garfield’s death,

21. Id. § 19(d)(2); Second Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession,
Fifty Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations for Improving the Presidential
Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 949-50 (2017) [hereinafter Second Fordham Clinic
Report].
22. See John D. Feerick, Presidential Inability: Filling in the Gaps, 33 POL. & LIFE SCI. 11,
12-13 (2014) [hereinafter Presidential Inability].
23. TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 8.
24. See generally CANDICE MILLARD, DESTINY OF THE REPUBLIC: A TALE OF MADNESS,
MEDICINE AND THE MURDER OF A PRESIDENT (2011).
25. FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 13, at 118.
26. MILLARD, supra note 24, at 227-28.
27. TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 9.
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eighty days after Garfield had been shot.
Nearly fifty years after Garfield’s death, on October 2, 1919, President
Woodrow Wilson suffered a stroke that partially paralyzed him and set off
another presidential inability crisis. Wilson was left unable to discharge the
powers and duties of office for the nearly year-and-a-half remaining in his term.28
The third Indiana Vice President, Thomas Marshall, had to navigate many of the
same challenges that Chester Arthur faced before him.29
But, unlike during Garfield’s inability, Wilson and his closest associates
aggressively resisted attempts to have the Vice President act as president.
Secretary of State Robert Lansing suggested that Wilson’s doctor or secretary
certify that Wilson was disabled so Marshall could act as President, but Wilson’s
closest aides rejected the idea.30 Wilson demanded Lansing’s resignation a few
months later after learning that Lansing had called Cabinet meetings to handle
pressing matters in Wilson’s absence.31 Matters that the Cabinet did not address
were mostly handled by Wilson’s wife, Edith.32
The lack of procedures for declaring the president unable made a transfer of
power nearly impossible. If Marshall had asserted that he was acting as president,
there is little doubt that Wilson and his allies would have challenged him.
The Succession Clause’s ambiguities and gaps were again problematic during
the Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower suffered three serious health
episodes: a heart attack in 1955; intestinal inflammation that required surgery in
1956; and a stroke in 1957.33 After his stroke, he grew deeply concerned about his
health and the lack of constitutional procedures for handling presidential
inabilities.34
He responded with a “letter agreement” between him and Vice President
Richard Nixon.35 The agreement allowed Eisenhower, if disabled, to transfer the
powers of the presidency to Nixon. If Eisenhower could not communicate that he
was disabled, the agreement authorized Nixon to discharge the office’s powers
and duties after appropriate consultation. In both cases, the agreement called for
Nixon to serve as Acting President and gave Eisenhower the power to determine
the end of an inability.36

28. Id. at 15-16.
29. See generally Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-Presidential Behavior in a Disability Crisis: The
Case of Thomas R. Marshall, 33 POL. & LIFE SCI. 37 (2014).
30. FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 13, at 170-72.
31. See Goldstein, supra note 29, at 44.
32. In fact, a recent book called Madam President asserts that she took such a significant role
that she was essentially the nation’s first woman president. See WILLIAM HAZELGROVE, MADAM
PRESIDENT : THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF EDITH WILSON (2016).
33. See John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the TwentyFifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 921 (2010) [hereinafter Presidential Succession and
Inability].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 921-22.
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The “letter agreement” was a significant advance in resolving the gaps and
ambiguities in the Succession Clause and provided ideas that influenced the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s development. But the “letter agreement” suffered
from major flaws, especially the absence of checks on the President’s power to
declare the end of an inability. It also did not have the force of law behind it.
Congressional hearings on presidential succession occurred in the final years of
the Eisenhower administration, but no legislation ensued.37
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 finally spurred
action. With Eisenhower’s health problems fresh in lawmakers’ minds, the
assassination again raised the prospect of a presidential inability crisis. If the
assassin’s bullet had struck Kennedy slightly differently, he could have been left
alive, but incapacitated, just like President Garfield.38
Under Birch Bayh’s leadership,39 Congress opened hearings in 1964 on
presidential inability,40 and the ABA convened a conference on the subject. The
ABA conference—of which I was privileged to be part—worked closely with
Congress, particularly Senator Bayh, in crafting and building support for what
became the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.41 On July 6, 1965, Congress approved the
proposed amendment,42 and it was ratified on February 10, 196743 and proclaimed
by President Lyndon Johnson on February 23, 1967.44
The amendment has four sections. Section 1 provides that the Vice President

37. TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 50-53; see also Presidential Inability:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
85th Cong. (1958); Presidential Inability: Hearing Before the Special Subcomm. on Study of
Presidential Inability of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. (1957); Presidential Inability:
Hearings Before Special Subcomm. to Study Presidential Inability of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong. (1956).
38. TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 55. Although the Kennedy assassination
was the pivotal catalyst for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s development, mounting anxiety over
the rise of the nuclear age likely also played a very significant role. See Rebecca C. Lubot, “A Dr.
Strangelove Situation”: Nuclear Anxiety, Presidential Fallibility, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1175 (2017).
39. Senator Bayh provides a full account of his work on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in his
book One Heartbeat Away. See BIRCH BAYH , ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY
AND SUCCESSION (1968).
40. See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendment of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. (1964),
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=twentyfifth_amendme
nt_congressional_materials [https://perma.cc/4HYW-3JGC].
41. John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: A Personal Remembrance, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1075 (2017).
42. 111 CONG. REC. 15,596 (1965).
43. TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 105.
44. See LYNDON B. JOHNSON, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
LYNDON B. JOHNSON 217-18 (1968).
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becomes President if the President dies, resigns, or is removed from office.45 By
listing the only contingencies where the Vice President becomes President,
Section 1 resolves the issues stemming from the Tyler precedent. The
Amendment’s inability provisions in Sections 3 and 4 make clear that the Vice
President acts as President only when the President is disabled.46 Section 1 was
used on August 9, 1974 when Vice President Gerald R. Ford succeeded to the
presidency upon President Richard Nixon’s resignation.47
Section 2 allows the President to fill a vacancy in the vice presidency. Under
this section, the President’s nominee must receive approval from majorities of
both the House of Representatives and the Senate.48 Before the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment’s ratification, sixteen Vice Presidents did not finish their terms: eight
succeeded to the presidency, seven died, and one resigned. Those vacancies left
the country without a Vice President for more than 37 combined years.49 Section
2 has been used twice: first when President Nixon nominated Gerald Ford to be
Vice President following Spiro Agnew’s resignation in 1973 and then when
President Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller to be Vice President following
Ford’s succession to the presidency upon Nixon’s resignation in 1974.50
Section 3 allows the President, on his own initiative, to temporarily transfer
presidential power to the Vice President by submitting a written declaration of
inability to the Speaker of the House and Senate President pro tempore. The
President can return to the office’s powers and duties by submitting another
written declaration to the same officials.51 President Ronald Reagan invoked
Section 3 to transfer power to Vice President George H.W. Bush prior to
undergoing cancer surgery in 1985,52 and President George W. Bush invoked the
provision to transfer power to Vice President Dick Cheney before colonoscopies
in 2002 and 2007.53
Section 4 is the provision that has been the focus of recent discussion of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. It allows for the President’s temporary removal from
presidential power if he is unable or unwilling to invoke Section 3. When the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet submit a declaration to the Speaker
of the House and Senate President pro tempore stating that the President is
unable, the Vice President becomes Acting President.54 When the President
submits a declaration that he is not unable, the Vice President and Cabinet have

45. U.S. CONST . amend. XXV, § 1.
46. See U.S. CONST . amend. XXV, §§ 3-4.
47. TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 164-65.
48. See U.S. CONST . amend. XXV, § 2.
49. TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 313-14.
50. Goldstein, supra note 15, at 970-72.
51. See U.S. CONST . amend. XXV, § 3.
52. TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 196-99.
53. Id. at 202-03; see also Second Fordham Clinic Report, supra note 21, at 926-27 (noting
instances when presidents considered using Section 3, but did not ultimately invoke it).
54. See U.S. CONST . amend. XXV, § 4.
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four days to consider whether to reassert that the President is unable.55 If they do
not make another inability declaration in that four-day period, the President
returns to power.56 If they submit another declaration reasserting that the
President is unable, Congress must “decide the issue”57 within twenty-one days.
If two-thirds of both houses of Congress do not concur that the President is
unable, the President returns to power.58 If two-thirds conclude that the President
is unable, he remains out of power.59 During the four-day and twenty-one-day
periods, the Vice President continues to serve as Acting President.60 The process
can be reactivated at any time by either the President or Vice President and
Cabinet.61 Section 4 has never been used, but White House officials did discuss
its invocation following the assassination attempt on President Reagan in 1981.62
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not clarify the ambiguity in the
Succession Clause regarding what constitutes inability. This was not an oversight.
The amendment’s framers left “Inability” undefined to provide flexibility for
future scenarios that they could not predict.6 3 But the framers did have a general
concept of situations where invocation of the amendment would be appropriate.64
They were influenced by President Eisenhower’s view of conditions that might
constitute inabilities. In an accompanying memorandum to his letter agreement
with Vice President Nixon, Eisenhower identified several situations that might
require transfers of power, including “disease or accident that would prevent the
President from making important decisions,” break downs in communications
between a travelling President and the Capital, and situations where the
President’s location was unknown, such as might occur if Air Force One
crashed.65 He said he would resign if he became permanently disabled.66
The terms “unable” and “inability” in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. How Congress would go about “decid[ing] the issue” had received little scholarly
attention until recently, when students in Fordham Law School’s Second Presidential Succession
Clinic and Yale Law School’s Rule of Law Clinic evaluated the issue in their respective works. See
YALE LAW SCH. RULE OF LAW CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION: A READER’S GUIDE 50-62 (2018), available at https://law.yale.edu/system/
files/area/clinic/document/mn082208_ls_readerguide_interior_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC9S5FUS]; Second Fordham Clinic Report, supra note 21, at 971-87.
58. See U.S. CONST . amend. XXV, § 4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 193-96.
63. Presidential Succession and Inability, supra note 33, at 925.
64. See id. at 925-26; TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 115-17; see also Second
Fordham Clinic Report, supra note 21, at 928-29.
65. See First Fordham Clinic Report, supra note 14, at 77-79 (full text of letter agreement and
accompanying memorandum).
66. See id.

52

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:43

“intended to cover all cases in which some condition or circumstance prevents the
President from discharging his powers and duties.”67 Physical and mental illness,
both temporary and permanent, were covered.68 Senator Bayh said inability in
Section 4 referred to an “impairment of the President’s faculties” that made him
“unable either to make or communicate his decisions as to his own competency
to execute the powers and duties of his Office.”69
Circumstances—not just the president’s condition—might be relevant to
determining whether an inability exists. Senator Bayh provided an example
during the debates on the amendment, stating, “A President who was unconscious
for 30 minutes when missiles were flying toward this country might only be
disabled temporarily, but it would be of severe consequence when viewed in light
of the problems facing the country.”70
The amendment’s framers noted some circumstances where invocation of the
amendment would not be appropriate. They were clear that unpopularity,
incompetence, impeachable conduct, policy and political differences, poor
judgment, and laziness do not constitute “inabilities.”71
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment immensely improved the presidential
succession system, but further reform is still needed. Over the last three decades,
two commissions,72 three law school clinics,73 and a working group74 have
developed proposals and guidance to ensure that the nation is prepared for an
array of presidential succession scenarios.75 Senator Bayh has contributed to

67. John D. Feerick, A Response to Akhil Reed Amar’s Address on Applications and
Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 41, 53 (2010).
68. See TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 115.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 116.
71. Presidential Succession and Inability, supra note 33, at 926.
72. See MILLER CTR. COMM ’N NO. 4, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT (1988), http://web1.millercenter.org/
commissions/comm_1988.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GKR-KWJ2]; CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM ’N,
supra note 13.
73. See First Fordham Clinic Report, supra note 14; Second Fordham Clinic Report, supra
note 21; YALE LAW SCH. RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 57.
74. See PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY: PAPERS, DISCUSSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ISSUES OF INABILITY AND DISABILITY IN PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES (James F. Toole & Robert J. Joynt eds., 2001).
75. In addition to the work done by expert and student groups, individuals have advanced
many recommendations for improving the succession system in the decades since the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment’s ratification. See, e.g., JAMES M. RONAN, LIVING DANGEROUSLY: THE
UNCERTAINTIES OF PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION (2015); Roy E. Brownell II, What
to Do If Simultaneous Presidential and Vice Presidential Inability Struck Today, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1027 (2017); Robert E. Gilbert, Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The
Difficulties Posed By Psychological Illness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (2010); Norman Ornstein,
A Better Way on Presidential Succession, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/02/AR2007030201141.html [https://perma.cc/7BZE-DUM6];
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almost all of these efforts. In fact, he co-chaired the first such initiative—the
Miller Center Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, which issued its recommendations in 1988.76 The Commission
called on the White House to create plans for using the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment.77 That recommendation was inspired by the failure to invoke the
amendment after the Reagan assassination attempt.78
Against the backdrop of these recommendations, President George H.W.
Bush and Vice President Dan Quayle convened a meeting at the start of the Bush
administration to discuss how they would handle situations where the president
became disabled.79 Vice President Quayle recalled in an interview for this article
that the hour-long meeting involved the White House Counsel explaining how
invocations of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment would work.80 He said the Bush
administration’s approach did not involve any signed agreements in which the
parties bound themselves to proceed in a certain manner if the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment was implicated.81 Rather, the Bush administration relied on reaching
consensus and coordinating through the Chief of Staff.82 In considering how to
use the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the fifth Indiana Vice President was planning
for uses of an amendment that a former Indiana Senator had guided to ratification.
Students at Fordham Law School have been grateful beneficiaries of Senator
Bayh’s lifelong commitment to succession issues. He spoke with the students in
both of the clinics on presidential succession that I co-taught;83 spoke to the
editors of the Fordham Law Review for an oral history of succession; 8 4 and gave
remarks and sat on all of the panels at a two-day symposium in 2010.8 5 Fordham
held another symposium in fall 2017 to mark the 50th anniversary of the TwentyFifth Amendment’s ratification,86 and the Fordham Law Review dedicated the

Amar & Amar, supra note 13; Goldstein, supra note 15; Presidential Inability, supra note 22.
76. See MILLER CTR. COMM ’N NO. 4, supra note 72.
77. Id. at 4.
78. See id. at 4-6; TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 221-24 (summarizing and
listing the Miller Commission’s recommendations).
79. TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT , supra note 5, at 200-01.
80. See Appendix A (quoting excerpts from the interview with Vice President Quayle).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. First Fordham Clinic Report, supra note 14, at 7-8; Second Fordham Clinic Report, supra
note 21, at 921.
84. A Modern Father of Our Constitution: An Interview with Former Senator Birch Bayh,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 781 (2010) [hereinafter A Modern Father of Our Constitution] (interview
with Senator Bayh published as part of the 2010 symposium).
85. See Remarks from Senator Birch Bayh, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1091 (2010); see also
Symposium: The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in the 21st Century, Part 1,
FORDHAM L. ARCHIVE SCHOLARSHIP & HIST . (Apr. 10, 2010), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
twentyfifth_amendment_photos/2/ [https://perma.cc/M2TQ-A6XV] (video of Senator Bayh’s
remarks); A Modern Father of Our Constitution, supra note 84.
86. See Matthew Diller, Symposium: Continuity in the Presidency: Gaps and Solutions, 86
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resulting symposium issue to Senator Bayh.87
Senator Bayh received other honors tied to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s
anniversary in 2017. The American Bar Association awarded him with a
Presidential Citation and the Bipartisan Policy Center issued a letter
commendation recognizing his work on the amendment.88 And Indiana’s senior
Senator, Joseph Donnelly, honored Senator Bayh in remarks on the Senate floor.89
It takes a wide range of talents for a legislator to be as successful as Senator
Bayh. It is not by accident that a Senator frames two constitutional
amendments—more than anyone since James Madison.90 In fact, Senator Bayh
was nearly responsible for three amendments. The Equal Rights Amendment was
adopted by Congress and would have been added to the Constitution if only a
handful of additional states had approved it.91 Senator Bayh also had great
influence as the Constitution’s gatekeeper, using his role as Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments to keep some amendments out of
the Constitution.
One of Senator Bayh’s great skills that I saw when I watched him craft and
build support for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was his ability to foster
consensus, especially across party lines. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was a
truly bipartisan effort.92 Democrats and Republicans worked together to address
serious vulnerabilities that made the nation less secure. As the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment enters its second half-century in the Constitution, we should hope
that lawmakers follow Senator Bayh’s model to further strengthen the succession
system.
II. IMPEACHMENT
Turning to the impeachment provisions, the Constitution states in Article II,
§ 4, “[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,

FORDHAM L. REV. 911 (2017).
87. John D. Feerick, Dedication to Senator Birch E. Bayh, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 907 (2017).
88. See The First 50 Years of the 25th Amendment, Part 1, FORDHAM L. ARCHIVE
SCHOLARSHIP & HIST . (May 10, 2017), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_
photos/6/ [https://perma.cc/6JU8-FVNH] (video recording of the award presentations).
89. 163 CONG. REC. S2046 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2017) (statement of Sen. Donnelly).
90. Jesse Wegman, The Man Who Changed the Constitution, Twice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/opinion/birch-bayh-constitution.html
[https://perma.cc/FLV8-HKG3].
91. See Robinson Woodward-Burns, The Equal Rights Amendment is One State from
Ratification. Now What?, WASH. POST (Jun. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/20/the-equal-rights-amendment-is-one-state-from-ratification-nowwhat/?utm_term=.d5fcd61f4ed4 [https://perma.cc/E27L-A7EC].
92. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment: Republican Contributions to the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1137 (2017).
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Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”93 In combination with the
sections in Article I granting the House “the sole Power of Impeachment”94 and
the Senate the “sole Power to try all Impeachments,”95 Congress is provided with
a mechanism to remove Executive and Judicial branch members in the
appropriate circumstances.
The brevity of these Sections belies the consequential authority Congress is
granted. But this authority must be read against a backdrop stretching back
centuries.96 The Framers considered this history as they measured the words of
these Sections.97 Since the early days of our Nation, this history and the Framers’
deliberations have informed its continuing exposition. When the House and
Senate exercise these powers, they look back to their roots as they proceed
through a complex process and grapple with the recurring question of what
precisely constitutes an impeachable offense.
A. The Process of Impeachment and Conviction
A sketch of the underlying processes and procedures by which the House
impeaches and the Senate convicts is instructive. The process notably shares
some surface similarities with criminal justice procedures.98 For example, the
House might be viewed as similar to a grand jury issuing an indictment, while the
Senate trial and judgment shares some similarities with a petit jury, as the finders
of fact, and judge, as the administrator of the process and arbiter of the law.99
However, it is important to recognize that despite these similarities, impeachment
and conviction remain distinct, unique, and, above all, political processes.100
Impeachment and conviction do not preclude criminal indictment and
conviction.101 And impeachment and conviction result only in removal from
office, with the possibility of being barred from holding future office if the Senate
votes in favor of this additional sanction.102 The primary purpose is to safeguard
the integrity of the American constitutional system, not to punish.103
1. The Role of the House of Representatives.—Article I of the Constitution

93.
94.
95.
96.

U.S. CONST . art. II, § 4.
U.S. CONST . art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
U.S. CONST . art I, § 3, cl. 6.
ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-186, IMPEACHMENT : AN OVERVIEW
OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS , PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE 7 (2010).
97. John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions,
39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 15-23 (1970) [hereinafter Impeaching Federal Judges].
98. SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41172, THE ROLE OF THE SENATE
IN JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS : PROCEDURE, PRACTICE, AND DATA 3 (2010).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. S. REP. NO. 101-1, at 19 (1989); see also BAZAN, supra note 96, at 7; SMELCER, supra
note 98, at 3.
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allocates, as noted, to the House of Representatives the “sole Power of
Impeachment” and to the Senate the “sole Power to try all Impeachments.”104 This
means that the House exercises exclusive control over whether to impeach and
which articles of impeachment will be presented to the Senate at trial.105 A
number of different triggers have led to impeachment investigations, including
allegations made by Members, recommendations of an investigating House
committee, requests from the President, “charges transmitted from the legislature
of a state or territory or from a grand jury,” or by recommendation of the Judicial
Conference of the United States.106
In deciding whether to pursue articles of impeachment against a person, at
least two preliminary questions must be addressed. First, is the person the
President, Vice President, or a civil officer—and therefore an impeachable
person—as contemplated by the Constitution?107 Second, does the person’s
conduct constitute treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, or
alternatively, is the conduct impeachable?108 This second question is where much
of the deliberation occurs, and will be revisited below. To answer this question,
the House Judiciary Committee must perform an investigation and report to the
House with a recommendation.109 Regardless of the recommendation, the House
may then vote, with a simple majority required to adopt the articles.110 Once the
articles are adopted, the House appoints impeachment Managers (from the House)
to conduct the case against the impeached party in the Senate trial.111 The House
managers may also engage counsel to assist in the trial process.112
2. The Role of the Senate.—The House then sends a message informing the
Senate of the impeachment and asking that the Senate prepare for trial.113 The
Senate responds to the message with a time at which the Managers should appear
before the bar of the Senate to verbally impeach the party and demand a trial.114
Before sitting as a Court of Impeachment, the Constitution requires that all

104. U.S. CONST . art. 1, §§ 2-3; see also Impeaching Federal Judges, supra note 97, at 1;
SMELCER, supra note 98, at 3.
105. BAZAN, supra note 96, at 9.
106. Id. at 9 n.38.
107. Id. at 15.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 9 n.38.
110. Impeachment, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES,
http://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Impeachment/ [https://perma.cc/D33SUQ9T] (Last visited Oct. 9, 2018).
111. List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachment/
Impeachment-List/ [https://perma.cc/7K5V-C2ED] (last visited Oct. 9, 2018).
112. T.J. HALSTEAD , CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-806, AN OVERVIEW OF THE IMPEACHMENT
PROCESS 5 (2005).
113. SMELCER, supra note 98, at 8.
114. Id.
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participating members of the Senate take an oath or affirmation.115 Further, in the
event of a presidential impeachment, the Constitution requires that the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court act as the Presiding Officer in the proceedings.116
Where the Constitution is largely silent on the remaining procedures, the
Senate relies on the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting
on Impeachment Trials, which were adopted prior to the impeachment of
President Andrew Johnson and have been used for all impeachments, largely
unchanged, since then.117 The Senate process is notable for its judicial nature,
including the issuance of the summons to the impeached party, opening
statements by the House Managers and the counsel for the accused, procedures
for evidence and the questioning of witnesses, and closing statements.118
After the trial the Senate deliberates, usually behind closed doors.119 At the
end of the deliberation process, the Senate may no longer proceed in a closed
session, and must vote by roll-call in open session.120 The Constitution requires
two-thirds to convict, with anything less resulting in an acquittal.121 If the party
is convicted. the Senate removal automatically follows, and the Senate may then
vote on whether to disqualify the impeached party from holding future office,
with only a majority necessary to disqualify.122
3. Conclusion of Impeachment Process.—While the above recital of the
process may seem lengthy, it is actually an abbreviated description. The relatively
short sections of the Constitution addressing impeachment have predictably
spawned a great deal of consideration and deliberation by both the House and the
Senate. It is particularly worth noting the transformation of the Senate into a
quasi-judicial body. Even though the Constitution imposes only three
requirements on the Senate,123 the body has voluntarily adopted procedurally
elaborate Rules for its trials that mirror what one might expect to see in a court.124
B. Impeachable Offenses
What precisely qualifies as an impeachable offense? In the context of
impeachable conduct, the Constitution refers to “Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.”125
Treason is defined in Article III, § 3 of the Constitution as consisting of either
“levying War against [the United States],” or alternatively “in adhering to their

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

U.S. CONST . art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
Id.
SMELCER, supra note 98, at 5.
U.S. CONST . art. I, § 3, cl. 6; S. Doc. No. 104-1, at 100-27 (1995).
SMELCER, supra note 98, at 15.
Id. at 17.
U.S. CONST . art. I, § 3, cl. 6; S. Doc. No. 104-1, at 120 (1995).
SMELCER, supra note 98, at 18.
U.S. CONST . art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
See S. Doc. No. 104-1, at 100-27 (1995).
U.S. CONST . art. II, § 4.
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Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”126 The Section goes on to say: “No
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses
to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”127
One of the first insights came during the Treason and Sedition trial of John
Fries in 1800, where he stood accused of Treason for leading a rebellion in
response to a direct federal property tax.128 Supreme Court Justice Samuel
Chase—who would later be impeached in part for his role in this case—instructed
the jury that to commit treason, the accused must participate in an insurrection
within the United States for the purpose of accomplishing by force or violence
“any object of a great public nature, or of public and general (or national)
concern.”129 Justice John Marshall expanded on the meaning of levying war in Ex
Parte Bollman130 and United States v. Burr,131 finding that conspiracy to commit
treason was not enough, and that some level of force must be threatened or used
before a party could be said to levy war.132 Finally, Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story suggested that intent, in the form of a “treasonable purpose,” is a necessary
element.133 Therefore, the high bar for treason through levying war would seem
to require intent to pursue a treasonable purpose and an overt act taken to carry
out that purpose that demonstrates some plausible ability to actually threaten or
use force.
The second way a citizen might commit treason is through adhering to and
aiding the enemy. Two cases from World War II illuminate the necessary
elements. The first, Cramer v. United States,134 established that both elements,
adhering and aiding, must be satisfied.135 The Supreme Court suggested that
adhering to the enemy is not enough absent some overt act providing aid or
comfort,136 nor is taking an action that might be said to aid the enemy if the
purpose is not to betray the United States.137 In Kawakita v. United States,1 3 8 the
Court reiterated the requirements, performing a lengthy analysis of both the intent
behind the actions and whether the conduct “actually promoted the cause of the
enemy.”139 Once again, the standard is high and requires both intent to support an
enemy and an effective overt act that provides aid.
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128.
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131.
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134.
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U.S. CONST . art. III, § 3, cl 1.
Id.
See Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924, 944 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 5127).
Id. at 930.
Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807).
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692a).
Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 126; United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 13.
In re Charge to the Grand Jury-Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1046, 1047 (C.C.D.R.I. 1842) (No.
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Id. at 31.
Id. at 29.
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Bribery is a concept with substantial legal history. As observed by Justice
Story in his COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, it is a concept that can be
interpreted by resort to the common law.140 In exploring English precedent,
Blackstone suggested that bribery occurs when an official accepts “any undue
reward to influence his behavior in his office.”141
Bribery also has a long statutory history. The very First Congress enacted a
statute criminalizing the acceptance by judges of anything of value in exchange
for making a favorable judgment or disposition.142 This statute survives to this
day.143 In its current iteration, it covers public officials and employees of the
United States government, and criminalizes the acceptance of anything of value
in exchange for “being influenced in the performance of an official act,” assisting
in a fraud on the United States, or violating an official duty.144 The scope of this
statute has been most recently explored in McDonnell v. United States,145 where
the court found that “[t]o qualify as an official act, the public official must make
a decision or take an action on [a] question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy, or agree to do so.”1 46 While this likely limited the scope of the
statute, the Court left the statute largely intact by declining to find that it was
unconstitutionally vague.147
The phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” is not immediately or
intuitively obvious. Understanding this clause requires a look at its history.
1. English Precedent.—An English impeachment that occurred
contemporaneously with the Constitutional Convention was that of Warren
Hastings.148 Three days before the Convention convened, the House of Commons
impeached Hastings for “high crimes and misdemeanors.” The charges against
Hastings, who was previously the governor of India, included “mismanagement
and misgovernment in India, including acts of extortion, bribery, corruption,
confiscation of property, and mistreatment of various provinces.”149 In arguing
at the Convention that an earlier draft of Article II, Section 4 that limited
impeachment to “treason and bribery” was too narrow, George Mason of Virginia
observed that Hastings’ actions might not have been captured by such narrow
language.150 Mason suggested the use of the “high crimes and misdemeanors”

140. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 561-62 (Thomas M. Cooley ed.,
1873).
141. IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 136-39 (1769).
142. Crimes Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 112, 117.
143. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(2)(a)-(c) (2019).
144. Id.
145. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
146. Id. at 2372 (internal quotations omitted).
147. Id. at 2375.
148. John D. Feerick, The Hastings Impeachment, Acquittal, N.Y. L. J., May 28, 1974, at 1.
149. Impeaching Federal Judges, supra note 96, at 9; see also GEORGE ROBERT GLEIG,
MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT HON. WARREN HASTINGS 283-85 (1841); P. J. MARSHALL,
THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS (1965).
150. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 550 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).

60

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:43

expression, and it was ultimately adopted as part of the Constitution.151
In approximately forty English cases spanning more than four hundred years,
convictions for high crimes and misdemeanors “involved acts of a criminal
nature, grave misuse of one’s official position, or treasonous-like conduct.”152
While many of these cases involved a violation of statutory or common law, a
violation of positive law did not appear to be a prerequisite to impeachment.153
The cases offer little precedent, however, supporting the impeachment of “an
official for conduct not constituting either a crime or gross abuse of official
duties.”154
2. The Constitutional Convention.—The 1787 debates “reveal that the
primary concern of the Framers was not acts that could be committed by any
citizen, but rather acts associated with the exercise of a public trust that could
endanger the nation.”155
James Madison expressed concern that the President “might pervert his
administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his
trust to foreign powers.”156 Edmund Randolph of Virginia worried that “[t]he
Executive will have great opportunit[ies] of abusing his power; particularly in
time of war when the military force, and in some respects the public money will
be in his hands.”157 George Mason justified the expansion of the impeachment
powers in part based on the Constitutional prohibition on Bills of Attainder,158
which had been used by the British Parliament to punish by simply legislating
that a named individual should be punished.159 Mason argued that since the Bills
of Attainder were prohibited, it was appropriate to expand the impeachment
powers.160
The Framers were also influenced by the early state constitutions,161 which
provided for impeachment to remedy misconduct with regards to the duties of
public office.162 All of this suggests that the expression high crimes and
misdemeanors reaches a specific form of misconduct: the abuse of, or severe
misbehavior, while holding an official position to the detriment of the nation and

Impeaching Federal Judges, supra note 97, at 49.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Impeaching Federal Judges, supra note 97, at 22; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150 at 550.
159. KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40826, BILLS OF ATTAINDER : THE
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESS LEGISLATING NARROWLY 3 (2014); Impeaching
Federal Judges, supra note 97, at 6 n.25.
160. Impeaching Federal Judges, supra note 97, at 22; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 550.
161. Impeaching Federal Judges, supra note 97, at 15.
162. Id. at 49.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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the integrity of the Constitution.163
3. Past Impeachments.—The impeachment powers have been used sparingly
across our history. Only nineteen persons have been impeached in the history of
the United States, including two presidents, one senator, one Cabinet member and
fifteen judges, one of whom was a Supreme Court justice.164 Of those impeached,
one, Senator William Blount, had no Senate trial due to lack of jurisdiction, and
three others resigned either before the Senate trial commenced or before its
completion.165 Of the remaining fifteen, seven were acquitted after trials in the
Senate, and eight, all judges, were found guilty after trials.166 They were removed
from office and three of them were disqualified from holding future office.167
a. Judicial impeachments.—The judges’ proceedings offer some insight into
what constitutes “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Three who were removed
were indicted for crimes before they were impeached.168 Those three were Harry
Claiborne in 1986 after indictment for and conviction of income tax invasion,
Alcee Hastings in 1989 after indictment for and acquittal of bribery and perjury,
and Walter Nixon in 1989 after indictment for and conviction of making false
statements to a grand jury.169 Another judge, Thomas Porteous, was investigated
by the Department of Justice and ultimately impeached and convicted in 2010 for
accepting bribes and making false statements under penalty of perjury, though he
was never actually indicted.170 Judges Claiborne and Nixon were impeached and
convicted for wrongful conduct that does not appear directly linked to an abuse
of office.171 However, these two exceptions might be explained by a reluctance
on the part of Congress to allow judges who had been sentenced to prison, and
who refused to resign their posts, to continue collecting their salaries and return
to the bench after serving their sentences.172 The two others, Hastings and
Porteous, appeared to have misused their offices to solicit and accept bribes in
addition to their potentially illegal behavior.173
Of the remaining four judges who were convicted by the Senate, John
Pickering was impeached in 1803 and convicted in 1804 for both intoxication on
the bench and the unlawful handling of property claims, West H. Humphreys was
impeached and convicted in 1862 for refusing to hold court and waging war
against the United States, Robert Archbald was impeached in 1912 and convicted

163. STAFF OF H. COMM . ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., REP. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
1-27 (Comm. Print 1974).
164. List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, supra note 111.
165. Id.
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169. Michael J. Gerhardt, Lessons of Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 603, 614
(1999).
170. H.R. REP. NO. 111-427 (2010).
171. Gerhardt, supra note 169, at 613-14.
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in 1913 for improper business relationships with litigants, and Halsted Ritter was
impeached and convicted in 1936 for favoritism in appointing bankruptcy
receivers and for practicing law as a judge.174 Significantly, these latter four were
all impeached and convicted for activities that, while not necessarily statutorily
illegal, constituted an abuse of their positions.
b. Presidential impeachments.—Only two presidents, Andrew Johnson and
William Clinton, have been impeached by the House.175 Richard Nixon also
merits inclusion in an analysis of presidential impeachment, as his impeachment
was imminent after the House Judiciary Committee voted to recommend three
articles of impeachment,176 but was avoided through resignation.177
President Johnson was impeached for violating the Tenure in Office Act by
removing and replacing his Secretary of War, and for attempting to undermine
Congressional authority.178 Some of his articles of impeachment were linked to
the use of the executive power in a way Congress asserted was illegal.179 The
allegations that Johnson undermined Congressional authority implicated the use
of his position to harm another branch. Johnson’s counsel argued that without
some law and a criminal intent to violate that law, conviction would be
inappropriate as an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder.1 8 0 Johnson was ultimately
acquitted in the Senate trial thirty-five yes votes to nineteen no votes, one vote
shy of the necessary two-thirds for conviction.181
In drafting the articles for the Nixon impeachment, the House Judiciary
Committee seemed to believe that an abuse of power was necessary, and asserted
that he
abused the powers of his office, causing “injury to the confidence of the
nation and great prejudice to the cause of law and justice,” and resulting
in subversion of constitutional government; that he failed to carry out his
constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the laws; and that he failed
to comply with congressional subpoenas needed to provide relevant
evidence for the impeachment investigation.182
A minority of the House Committee asserted that errors of administration were

174. List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, supra note 111.
175. Id.
176. Richard Lyons & William Chapman, Judiciary Committee Approves Article to Impeach
President Nixon, 27 to 11, WASH. POST , July 28, 1974, at A01.
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insufficient, seeming to suggest that crimes or actions with criminal intent are
necessary to an impeachment.183
In the Clinton impeachment, the Republican majority of the House appeared
to express the view that misconduct unrelated to the exercise of power was
sufficient since it “undermined the integrity of his office, . . . brought disrepute
on the Presidency, . . . betrayed his trust as President, and . . . [was] subversive
of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the United
States.”184 The Democratic minority, on the other hand, asserted “that the
allegations that the President violated criminal laws in attempting to conceal that
relationship—even if proven true—[did not] amount to the abuse of official
power which is an historically rooted prerequisite for impeaching a President.”185
The Senate subsequently acquitted Clinton, with forty-five votes to convict and
fifty-five opposed on the first article for perjury and a fifty to fifty vote on the
second article for obstruction of justice, perhaps indicating that the charges of
personal misconduct were not constitutionally sufficient, or perhaps indicating a
vote largely along party lines.186
4. Evaluating the Grounds for Impeachment.—Some argue that the
Constitution contemplated “a broad definition of impeachable offenses . . .
[encompassing] any act—including non-criminal conduct—that would bring
disrepute upon the office.”187 Under this view, removal can be proper for noncriminal, private behavior that brings disrepute upon the person and office.188
Some go even further. Congressman Ford once famously said, during the
impeachment discussion regarding Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme
Court, that “an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of
Representatives considers to be at a given moment in history; conviction results
from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be
sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office.”189 His
statement was the catalyst for my undertaking a study of presidential
impeachment.
Others have argued that for impeachment to be proper, the public official
must (1) exceed their constitutional power to the detriment of another branch of
government; (2) behave in a manner grossly incompatible with the office; or (3)
use their power for an improper purpose or for personal gain.190 The first and last
share a common feature: The conduct is linked to the exercise of the powers of

183. BAZAN, supra note 96, at 26 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 362-72, printed at 120
CONG. REC. 29312-15 (1974)).
184. H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998).
185. H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 200 (1998).
186. 145 CONG. REC. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999).
187. Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, the Hamilton Affair, and Other
Constitutional Mythologies, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1840 (1999).
188. Id. at 1844.
189. 116 CONG. REC. 11,913 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Gerald Ford).
190. STAFF OF H. COMM . ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., REP. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 18 (Comm. Print 1974).
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the office. The second seems to retain the possibility that private misconduct may
be grounds for impeachment. But it is argued that such misconduct must be
particularly heinous to qualify.191
Nearly fifty years ago, as noted, I wrote an article responding to Congressman
Ford’s statement about the breadth of Congressional authority to impeach. I had
the help of a Fordham Law School student, Robert Quinn, and a young colleague
at Skadden Arps, Edward Yodowitz, which made the article possible. Senator
Sam Ervin of North Carolina placed the article in the Congressional Record and
later wrote to one of my law partners, stating, “I was honored to place in the
Congressional Record the excellent law review article written by your partner .
. . I have never seen a piece of work in this area which displayed the scholarly
research and painstaking analysis as does the article by Mr. Feerick.”192 Later,
Ervin would chair the Senate Impeachment Study Committee.
Drawing on English history, the Constitutional Convention, and subsequent
impeachments, I argued that “[i]n framing the impeachment provisions, the
concern of the framers was not limited to crimes of which private citizens and
public officials could be equally guilty,” but rather contemplated “the abuse or
betrayal of a public trust, offenses peculiar to public officials.”193 I reasoned that
impeachable offenses were neither limited to indictable offenses nor did they
extend to non-indictable offenses unconnected with the use of official power.194
I argued that for conduct to be impeachable, “[i]t must violate some known,
established law, be of a grave nature, and involve consequences highly
detrimental to the United States,” or that, “[i]n the alternative, it must involve
evil, corrupt, willful, malicious or gross conduct in the discharge of office to the
great detriment of the United States.”195 I did not believe that the grounds for
impeachment should be broadened to encompass purely personal misconduct, not
because such misconduct should be protected, but out of a concern for the
independence of the Judiciary and Executive.196 I suggested in my article that the
“process of removing should be made as difficult as possible, though not to the
extent of leaving the nation powerless to remove an official who betrays his
public trust.”197 Ultimately, I advocated for such a standard because I believed
that limiting the grounds for impeachment was the necessary price to prevent the
abuse of impeachment to crush adversaries or remove them from office.198 Then,
as now, “[n]othing could be more destructive of our system of government.”199

191. Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 (1998) (Written Testimony of
Professor Cass Sunstein).
192. Letter from Sam Ervin, former N.C. Sen. to John D. Feerick (on file with author).
193. Impeaching Federal Judges, supra note 97, at 53.
194. Id. at 54.
195. Id. at 54-55.
196. Id. at 58.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The provisions on presidential succession and impeachment are designed to
keep the country safe, with a successor in the wings if a succession event occurs,
and protected if a President violates the specific grounds set forth in the
Constitution. In one case a sitting President may be removed from his powers and
duties and in the other case he may be removed from office and disqualified from
holding future office. In both cases the removal is made difficult so as to respect
the voice of the people in choosing a president. In one case it takes a two-thirds
vote of each House of Congress to remove a President against his will and in the
other a two-thirds vote of the Senate, after a trial presided over by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. In the long history of the country neither event has
happened. How fortunate the American democracy is to have had such a history.
But if the nation does ever encounter a situation where a president is removed
from office, it will be more prepared as a result of the experiences and
accomplishments of Indiana public servants.

66

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:43

APPENDIX A
The following excerpts are from a telephone interview of former Vice President
Dan Quayle that the author of this article conducted on July 24, 2018.
Indiana’s Vice Presidents:
John Feerick: I was just curious as a starter, any reflections on the Indiana
history with respect to the subject of presidential succession?
Dan Quayle: Well we had had six vice presidents, you know second only to the
state of New York.
JF: Yes and actually I think one of them, [Schuyler] Colfax, is used in the count
of both states.
[Laughter]
DQ: There’s a lot of interesting history of Vice Presidents. You know the first
Indiana Vice President was Colfax. He had an interesting ride, as Grant’s Vice
President. I think historically Grant was quite good, but he had a lot of problems
with nepotism and things like that.
Meeting called by President George H.W. Bush in April 1989 to plan for uses of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:
DQ: The meeting was initiated by [White House Counsel] Boyden Gray. He
served eight years as counsel to Vice President Bush. I think there was a feeling
that this issue wasn’t adequately addressed in the Reagan administration. That
was very interesting hence Reagan had had an assassination attempt. When the
Bush team took over this was one of the first things they did. It was in the first
several months of the administration where we had the meeting on Presidential
succession. Boyden had all the documents. He went through it all, how it would
work. The meeting probably lasted maybe an hour and everyone knew what the
situation was and that was it. I don’t think we ever had any subsequent meeting
on that issue. We wanted everyone in the room to agree to how this was all going
to work.
JF: In the literature, there’s some, I might say, confusion as to whether or not at
that meeting the general discussion got embodied in some kind of document. I
know there was a press conference later that month by [White House Press
Secretary Marlin] Fitzwater, as I recall, and he said, my recollection is, that there
were no agreements, but one of the doctors somehow suggested that there was.
Do you have any recollection whether there was any understanding of approaches
that got embodied in some kind of writing?
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DQ: No, there was no signed document if you will. We just didn’t work like that.
But clearly Boyden had documents that would be implemented if the situation
occurred. So there were documents.
Potential presidential inability scenarios during Vice President Quayle’s term:
JF: I mention in my book on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, in May of 1991
there was an irregular heartbeat issue that President Bush suffered and then the
president fell ill in Japan in 1992, but both occasions he seemed to jump right
back. In those situations, do you have any recollection as to whether or not you
were communicated with about them?
DQ: Well in both situations I communicated with the Chief of Staff. That’s the
way it works. The Japan event resolved itself fairly quickly because I picked up
the phone and called Barbara and said, “What going on over there?” She said he
just overdid it, he’s just got a touch of the flu. It was four o’clock in the morning
Washington time. She said, “Go back to bed everything’s fine.” I said, “Okay.”
I called the Chief of Staff and said, “Calm down. Everything’s okay.”
The other issue is when a president undergoes an anesthetic. The question is do
you implement the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or not. We had a discussion about
that when President Bush had a particular medical procedure. I think there were
documents prepared to do it and then at the end of the day we decided not to do
it. It was a fairly short time that he was going to be incommunicado. This
underscores how detailed, thoughtful that Boyden and his crew really were on
this issue. After serving as Vice president for 8 years, the Bush team believed the
presidential succession needed more thought, detail, documents, etcetera.
Vice President Quayle’s role as the next person in line to presidency:
JF: As a generalization, did you have any feelings at the time about the prospect
of potentially having to decide whether the president was disabled and serving as
acting president?
DQ: Well it’s not a decision of one. There was a lot of collegiality in the Bush
administration and what you do is you really rely on his people for the consensus.
That’s what I did when there was a discussion of whether there should be this
transfer of power. I said, “You decide and just let me know.” And that’s the way
it worked. Now if you have a more permanent situation than going under
anesthesia, that’s a different issue.
JF: Right, in your context it was the former.
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DQ: Right.
JF: And you weren’t getting any information that indicated that it was other than
what was being described.
DQ: Correct.

